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Freud proposed that the processes which occurred in the primal horde are essential
for understanding superego formation and therefore, the successful dissolution of the
Oedipus complex. However, Freud theorized superego formation in the primal horde as
if it is an instant, all-or-none achievement. The present paper proposes an alternative
model aiming to explain gradual development of superego in the primitive man. The
proposed model is built on knowledge from evolutionary and neural sciences as well as
anthropology, and it particularly focuses on the evolutionary significance of the acquisition
of fire by hominids in the Pleistocene period in the light of up-to-date archaeological
findings. Acquisition of fire is discussed as a form of sublimation which might have
helped Prehistoric man to maximize the utility of limited evolutionary biological resources,
potentially contributing to the rate and extent of bodily evolution. The limitations of both
Freud’s original conceptualization and the present model are discussed accordingly in an
interdisciplinary framework.
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Et tu, Brute?!
Julius Caesar, William Shakespeare
INTRODUCTION
Freud was one of the first theoreticians to elaborate on the evolu-
tionary mechanisms in human psychology. This viewpoint was
partially driven by the influence of the Lamarckian theory on
Freud’s conceptual work (Gershenowitz, 1978). Freud supported
the Lamarckian idea of “inheritance of acquired characteristics”
as means of linking his observations obtained at the patient level
to those innate biological characteristics idiosyncratic to humans,
which are acquired during the course of evolution. In his later
writings, Freud adopted Haeckel’s recapitulation theory (Gould,
1977) explained by the famous notion of “ontogeny recapitu-
lates phylogeny.” Recapitulation theory extended beyond early
20th century and the borders of the embryonic development, on
which it was initially based. For example in neurology, MacLean
proposed that the human brain consists of layers which date
back to different evolutionary origins (Holden, 1979; MacLean,
1985). Recent advancements in cognitive neuroscience support
this hypothesis, associating the limbic system with a more prim-
itive evolutionary origin (Mega et al., 1997), whereas the pre-
frontal cortex; which is a hub of rational decision making and
top-down control over the limbic system (Knoch et al., 2008)
is proposed to have evolved much later, both phylogenetically
and ontogenetically (Giedd, 2004). Haeckel’s theory of recapitu-
lation influenced Freud to move toward a Darwinian approach
from his initial Lamarckian viewpoint, leading him to explore
the adaptive functions of psychological mechanisms (Nesse and
Lloyd, 1992) and their significant disturbance in psychopathology
(Freud, 1923, 1926).
Among these psychological mechanisms the evolutionary
function of conscience and/or superego is particularly interesting.
Freud investigated the development and the functions of superego
at two levels; development of superego in the child and the ability
of superego formation as acquired by mankind during the course
of evolution. According to psychoanalytical theory, development
of superego in the child is a gradual process which is resolved by
internalization of the father’s norm (as well as normative behav-
iors) and subsequent repression of sexual urges cathected toward
the mother leading to a successful dissolution of the Oedipus
complex (Freud, 1924).
Overlaid onto the conscious and unconscious realms in the
topographical model (Freud, 1900), superego develops gradu-
ally and acts as an agent regulating the expressions of instinctual
needs by the reality principle. Freud developed the regulatory
role of superego in the structural model in three successive essays
between 1920 and 1926; in Beyond Pleasure Principle (Freud,
1920), Ego and Id (1923), and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety
(1926). As a part of this regulatory role, superego censors Trieb-
driven information (which originates from the id) from the ego.
In its affective repository, superego primarily makes use of fear of
punishment and derivative anxiety on one hand and anticipated
guilt on the other (Payne, 1927), when demands of the id find
expression behaviorally; bypassing regulations with the familial
and societal norms. Moral beliefs and particularly moral emo-
tions (e.g., guilt, shame, gratitude, indignation etc.) are important
in terms of regulating behavior and balancing selfish needs with
those accepted by societal norms, both in health (Tangney, 2002;
Tangney et al., 2007) and in psychiatric conditions; in which
there is abnormality in processing of these emotions (O’Connor
et al., 2007). Therefore, modern understanding of superego as
an observing agency may posit that it regulates behavior in
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accordance to dynamic societal norms and internalized borders
of personally acceptable behavior drawn by subjective degrees of
anticipated guilt and fear of punishment. Global evaluation of
behavioral research indeed suggests that guilt has an important
role in motivating morally congruent behavior, both in the acute
affective phase as well as when it is anticipated (see review of this
literature in Pulcu et al., 2013).
The focus of this paper is the different set of criteria Freud
employed for the development of superego in the primitive man
of the primal horde, in an attempt to shed light on how humans
acquired this capacity of self-regulation. Freud discussed the
superego formation in the primal horde as an achievement which
is a product of an instant dissolution. This controversy constitutes
the particular subject of this manuscript. The first section of this
paper will explore the formation of psychological self-regulatory
agency (i.e., superego) in the primal horde from an evolutionary
perspective. The second section examines the evolutionary signif-
icance and the psychoanalytical meaning of [the acquisition of]
fire (perhaps, one of the most important of all human achieve-
ments). The potential link between the acquisition of fire and
superego formation will be discussed accordingly, aiming to pro-
vide an evolutionary model in which superego may have emerged
gradually in the primal horde. Due to reconstructive nature of
the present discussion, although mostly unavoidable, it may be
regarded as speculative by some of its audience. This is explicitly
addressed in the limitations section. In order to address limita-
tions associated with a theoretical-reconstructive, rather than a
data-based approach; some of the technical and ethical limita-
tions restricting formulation of empirically testable hypotheses
will also be discussed.
THE PRIMAL HORDE
Freud’s views on the primal horde are among the first evolution-
ary writings on human psychology. The concept of primal horde
is constructed upon a similar concept which is called the “prim-
itive horde” used by Charles Darwin, referring to the simplest
possible form of a social group of mammals. On the other hand,
the primal horde refers to a primitive group of Homo sapiens in
which a powerful male ruled despotically over the rest. Due to
his physical fitness only the male leader had access to sexual grat-
ification. The descendents (sons) were forced to submit to the
will of the leader (primal father) or to confront him. At some
point along the course of time the primal father was killed by the
sons to take his possession. According to Freud, the internalized
traces of remorse and guilt following this act became the essence
of conscience and superego. Freud (1913) says:
“[the primitive men] hated their father, who presented such a
formidable obstacle to their craving for power and sexual desires,
but they loved and admired him too. After they got rid of him, had
satisfied their hatred and had put into effect their wish to identify
themselves with him, the affection which had all this time been
pushed under was bound to make itself felt. It did so in the form
of remorse. A sense of guilt made its appearance, which in this
incident coincided with the remorse felt by the whole group. The
dead father became stronger than the living had been.” (p. 143)
The condition of the sons in the primal horde, struggling between
sexual frustration and fear of the primal father, seems to resemble
the positioning of ego between id and superego in the struc-
tural model (Freud, 1923). Therefore, it is possible that Freud
might have formulated hypotheses about the primal horde in
order to give a holistic account of superego formation within
psychoanalytical meta-theory.
In the same essay Freud (1913) highlights the oral cannibalistic
mechanisms accompanying the identification. It is claimed that
the sons have devoured the flesh of the primal father to internalize
a part of him, leading to a complete psychological identification.
Freud’s view on the terminal resolution of the primal horde sce-
nario is implicitly challenged for example by Lantos (1958) who
provided a meticulous discussion of aggression and rejected any
expression of oral aggression as an ultimate resolution of rivalry. It
is claimed that neither self-preservative nor sexual instincts would
guide an individual to express oral aggression after killing, as
killing terminates rival aggression. Freud also suggested that, the
totem animal replaced the primal father in time as a materialized
symbol, which was then killed ceremonially as a commemoration.
Thus, Freud puts the murder of the primal father at the bottom
of all civil achievements, moral development and religion.
Although, Freud (1921) clearly stated the hypothetical nature
of his assumptions regarding the primal horde, its relevance with
the Oedipus complex and the superego formation is presented as
if it is an all-or-none achievement. Especially, the guilt emerg-
ing after the crime and the collaborative nature of the act calls
for attention. The group behavior and affective processing of
behavioral consequences suggest that the conditions of the pri-
mal horde in Freud’s hypothesis were already quite distinct from
similar cases of animal hordes. In this respect, one should con-
sider the presence of psychological mechanisms in the primal
horde situation in contrast to purely biological mechanisms in
any resembling animal hordes. Thus, Freud’s primal horde should
be placed further up on the evolutionary timeline relative to
Darwin’s primitive horde.
Both in Freud and Darwin’s reconstructions, tension driven
by sexual frustrations in the closed social group leads to phys-
ical challenges between the dominant male and the remaining
males who are competing for group leadership. The father, with
his immense influence on the female members of the horde, had
an exclusive access to sexuality. From the female point of view,
submission to the dominant male who exhibits cues of physi-
cal, reproductive and survival fitness is evolutionarily rewarding.
Getting pregnant from the dominant male is the evolutionarily
stable strategy1 for any female in the horde (see footnote). From
the male point of view, challenging the dominant male is the
evolutionary stable strategy for the rest of the males who have
to confront the dominant male in order to gain access to sexual
reproduction. The dominant male defends his acquired position
by forcing the rest of the males to take a flight response, and flee
from the horde. This view is expressed by Freud (1913) as a strat-
egy to prevent close-interbreeding in the group. Dawkins (1976)
who holds a similar opinion claims;
1An evolutionary stable strategy is defined as a strategy which, if most mem-
bers of a population adopt it, can not be improved by an alternative strategy
(Dawkins, 1976). It can be claimed that an ESS is immune to any kind of
deviant strategy trying to maximize individual gains in any population.
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“despite the uncertainties that await those who leave, it is a less of a
gamble compared to staying, for those who stay have to stick with
fight strategies to challenge to dominant male at the cost of their
lives.” (p. 119)
Consequently, the individual evolutionary economics of stay-
ing favors saving any possible investment (through parental
investment at the beginning of life and avoidance of reckless
encounters after the clinical developmental period) to grow big-
ger and stronger to challenge the dominant male at some point.
Otherwise the genes of the males which avoid physical confronta-
tions with the dominant male would not be represented in the
future genetic pool.
Optimizing fight or flight responses is a matter of concern
for only those individuals/cubs that survive through the critical
developmental period. During the critical developmental period,
successful attachment between the offspring and the mother is
the utmost important factor in determining the survival fitness
of the offspring, in which the offspring mostly has a passive role.
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1977; Bretherton, 1985) is biologi-
cal in the sense that it studies mother-infant attachment in the
critical developmental period and the impact of the way certain
skills are mastered during this period on later life [see (Holmes,
2011) for theoretical and clinical perspective about how different
mother-infant attachment styles influence the nature of superego
in later life]. It is important to point out that although develop-
mental course of humans and nonhuman animals follow a similar
course during the critical period, these are not directly compara-
ble as the human bear children prematurely relative to nonhuman
animals; which is considered as an evolutionary cost of achieving
bipedal locomotion (Whitcome et al., 2007). Therefore, once the
mother-infant affective bond is formed, the females in the pri-
mal horde, as well as in nonhuman animals, must be hardwired
to provide a secure attachment with their offspring so that off-
spring can master important survival skills which would directly
influence the extent of how much of parents’ genes will be avail-
able in the genetic pool in subsequent generations. Considering
this point from a genetic perspective (Dawkins, 1976), evolu-
tion would not favor diversity in attachment styles in nonhuman
animals [which may produce hyper-or-hypo vigilant individu-
als (Holmes, 2011) and these may have poor survival likelihood
relative to those individuals who follow a normal developmental
course], it is possible to speculate that the primal horde scenario
might have occurred before humans mastered bipedal locomo-
tion, when human behavior was more biologically determined.
This view suggests that although different attachment styles con-
tribute to how people perceive their social/physical environments
and master coping skills adaptively (Holmes, 2011), these did
not compromise immediate survival fitness of growing offspring
in the critical developmental period given that human evolution
favored diversity in this domain.
In the next step, it is important to address the problem of
interbreeding faced by those individuals who followed a normal
developmental course and out powered the primal father in a
physical competition. The problem of interbreeding has an effect
on the overall fitness of the horde in relation to horde’s size. A
negative correlation is predicted between the size of the horde
and possible detrimental consequences of interbreeding. When
the size of the horde is reduced to a single family a classical phe-
nomenon of Oedipus complex is observed. In psychoanalytical
theory, the father as the representative of the societal law pro-
hibits the son’s sexual desires targeted upon the mother. Thus,
the predominant tendency to take a flight from the family and
to find spouses through competition with other individuals who
do not have close a kin relationship seems to be an achievement
of mankind. This behavioral strategy contributes to the terminal
resolution of the Oedipus complex.
The following case is an example of a primal horde demon-
strating the possible consequences of close interbreeding. After
the death of the primal father, incest might have been a com-
mon practice in gratification of sexual desires. As a result, the
detrimental effects of close interbreeding were observed in the off-
spring. An inverse relationship is predicted between the frequency
of incest and the life expectancy of the offspring as the conditions
of prehistoric ages demanded physical fitness for survival. The
exquisite knowledge of the consequences of close interbreeding
and the works of recessive alleles were not available to the prehis-
toric man. It is possible that he was superstitious in making causal
attributions for environmental uncertainties. The deficiencies
observed in the offspring might have been attributed to the curse
of the primal father who was killed to gain access to sexual grat-
ification. Therefore, the essence of superego should have grown
gradually. At the end as Freud (1913) suggests, the primal father
becomes more powerful after he is been killed. In Freud’s model,
the figure of the primal father and his curse become gradually
omnipotent, replaced by the figure of God. In this reconstruction,
the memes 2 are observed as emerging out of genetic influences
and it might be suggested that the memes for “thou shall not
kill” and “thou shall not commit incest” probably were the first
complementary replicators (see footnote). The present view also
contributes to the understanding of the resolution of Oedipus
complex.
In summary, Freud proposed two hypotheses with psycho-
logical nature related to the primal horde. The first hypothesis
concerned the resulting guilt which emerged in relation to the
murder of the primal father. The second one concerned the col-
laborative nature of the murder. In the animal hordes which have
similar conditions to the primal horde (e.g., a horde of elephant
seals in which a dominant male controls a harem of females) the
successor replaces the dominant male. However, Freud presents
his hypothesis as if there is a revolution against the law of the
primal father: sons dethroning him. Freud’s emphasis on group
behavior separates the primal horde from the animal hordes.
I have used a quote from Shakespeare’s classical tragedy, Julius
Caesar, at the beginning of this section. I think it beautifully
illustrates formation of interpersonal networks to challenge an
autocratic leader. In his final words Caesar utters his astonish-
ment to see Brutus among the conspiring network. Although,
Freud did not make any explicit connections with Julius Caesar, it
2Dawkins (1976) introduces the memes as complementary replicators which
carry ideas, customs and other relevant cultural legacies. Just as genes, they
are subjected to natural selection and their life course depends on their
effectiveness in adaptation to the culture and the time.
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may be a topic of interest for historians of psychoanalytical theory
to explore whether Freud had considered the resemblance. The
guilt produced as a result of killing the primal father also sug-
gests that the primal horde went far enough on the evolutionary
timeline to be distinct from the rest of the animal hordes. This is
because actions motivated by life preservative instincts and drive
for reproduction do not produce guilt in animals.
Another key defense mechanism which Freud treats system-
atically differently between the primal horde scenario and in his
discussion of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex is repres-
sion. In psychoanalytical developmental psychology, repression of
sexual attachment of the infant to the mother contributes to the
successful dissolution of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1924). On
the other hand, Freud proposed that sexually motivated killing of
the primal father produced a profound guilt in the primal horde,
which is then commemorated annually by the killing of the totem
animal. This view suggests that the primal horde functioned with
a collective conscious that works against repression, particularly
of the memory of the murder and possibly the associated sex-
ual motivations. Freud’s conceptualization of repression in the
primal horde scenario also suggests that repression is an impor-
tant aspect of societal development which contributes to cultural
transformation that leads to formation of modern societies.
In order to fully grasp psychoanalytical processes in the primal
horde, it may be important to put these processes in a temporal
perspective. Challenge to the primal father suggests that behaviors
at this stage are biologically driven as it may be in any other ani-
mal hordes. Therefore, the execution of behavior (i.e., successfully
challenging the primal father) at this stage becomes a question of
adequacy rather than failed inhibition. Freud did not make any
explicit suggestions about the next component in this sequence,
namely what happened sexually once the primal father is killed.
Therefore, it is not possible to provide a reconstruction of this
stage, but I have discussed the potential consequences of inter-
breeding above. According to Freud, physical challenge is followed
by an affective response (i.e., guilt) which precedes inhibitory psy-
chological mechanisms at this stage, such as repression. However,
it is not possible dissociate affective and inhibitory processes from
each other conclusively; aiming to address whether guilt is reac-
tive to killing of the primal father or emerges retrospectively
after observing biological consequences of interbreeding which
are associated with the killing of the primal father. Consequently
it remains a puzzling question, whether repression and other
inhibitory mechanisms emerged post-hoc such that sequences
of actions with detrimental effects are avoided unconsciously
or propter-hoc in order to reduce psychological costs associated
with anticipated guilt which inhibits morally incongruent actions.
There is emerging evidence to suggest that guilt may be par-
ticularly important as evolutionary studies showed that agents
with prosocial emotions were favored by evolution (Bazzan et al.,
2002), emphasizing the importance of prosocial emotions in
maximizing utility by devaluing short-term rewarding outcomes
of self-serving decisions by providing additional psychological
costs.
Repression is a psychological defence mechanism which is
difficult to study empirically by neuropsychological testing bat-
teries (see below for further discussion). However, it may have
an important role in minimizing psychological costs, through
denying awareness to motivations which may lead to aversive
behavioral outcomes (Boag, 2007). Certain psychiatric conditions
are associated with abnormal evaluation of anticipated behavioral
outcomes in which anticipated affective responses devalue pro-
jected utility. Major depressive disorder is particularly interesting
in terms of understanding the magnitude of such projected psy-
chological costs through abnormal processing of guilt (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000), in which the moral self-evaluation
system is proposed to be on “overdrive” (O’Connor et al., 2007).
In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud (1917) provided the first
clinical account distinguishing depression from healthy forms of
sadness by highlighting the presence of abnormal self-criticism
“tormenting” the ego. Although Freud did not focus on the
possible involvement of inhibitory mechanisms, hyper scrutiny
of behavioral motivations and abnormal self-criticism in major
depression may be related to the failure of repression, such that
these unwanted thoughts become a cardinal object of depressive
rumination (Brinker and Dozois, 2009).
Discussions about whether psychoanalytical processes
observed in the primal horde and related ego defenses such
as repression would produce testable hypotheses within
moral/cognitive psychology framework is one of the key
challenges in neuropsychoanalysis (Boag, 2007). Modern
evidence-based neuroscience would support that Freud’s primal
horde should be distinct from Darwin’s primitive horde as higher
order cognitive processes such as guilt and repression, as well as
a general moral organization of the human brain which relate to
fronto-meso-limbic networks (Moll et al., 2005). These networks
are regarded to have evolved later than the medial temporal
regions, such as the amygdala, responsible for processing primary
emotions and fight-or-flight responses. Although, neurobiologi-
cal substrates of intra-family affective bonding, common to most
of the mammals, are localized in the limbic regions which are
regarded as phylogenetically more primitive (Young and Wang,
2004), key regions for healthy functioning of moral emotions,
such as the anterior cingulate and fronto-insular cortices in fact
contain neurons unique to humans (Seely et al., 2012). In the past
two decades, neuroscientists have identified effective paradigms
to decipher the function of the neocortex in moral/affective
processing domains, such as the Trolley Dilemma (which make
use of activating evolutionarily hardwired mechanisms for
valuation of human life, Greene et al., 2001) and/or Emotional
Stroop tasks (designed for understanding conflicting mechanisms
during cognitive/affective processing, Banich et al., 2000), which
could be used to study aggressive/sexual themes in hypothetical
conflicts. Nevertheless, integrating intra-family member oriented
scenarios in sexual/aggression domains to these paradigms may
pose serious ethical considerations, consequently limiting their
applicability as empirical investigation tools.
Although an exhaustive review of the consciousness literature
is beyond the merit of this paper, it is important to mention some
of the recent meta-analytical evidence about consciousness as
repression disrupts the flow of information from the unconscious
realm to consciousness. Recent evidence suggests that informa-
tion processed consciously requires mental imagery of the antic-
ipated situation, complex sequential behavioral planning and
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evaluation of potential consequences which relate to activations in
temporoparietal junction, frontopolar and medial orbitofrontal
cortices (Boly et al., 2013). These action sequences are unique to
humans, such that in animals sequential behavior is mostly con-
ditioned to obtain primary rewards, and in novel environments it
is mastered through learning in repeated trial and errors (but not
mental imagery), where mastery enhances connectivity between
brain regions associated with rewards and behavioral planning
(Schultz, 2004). Although there is an overlap in neural organi-
zation of consciousness between humans and nonhuman animals
(Boly et al., 2013), utility-based evaluation of behavior through
mental imagery of anticipated consequences is unique to humans.
In this respect, consciousness not only involves biological spa-
tial orientation increasing cost efficiency of motivated behavior
and peripheral sensory feedback but also psychological awareness.
Cytoarchitectural work started at the beginning of the century
with Korbinian Brodmann’s important contributions (1909), sug-
gests that the outermost layers of the cerebral cortex implicated
in mental imagery and sequential behavioral planning, such as
the frontopolar and temporoparietal cortical regions, are indeed
related to a later phylogenetic formation, distinguishing humans
from other nonhuman animal species.
Due to the evolutionary approach of the present manuscript,
it is important to point out to a few suggestions about the
evolutionary functions of repression (Nesse, 1990). One leading
suggestion also shared by some of the evolutionary biologists is
that repression conceals motives in the sexual/aggression domains
from oneself, and consequently concealing them even better from
other individuals (Trivers, 1985; Alexander, 1987). Arguably, if
the child is able to conceal such selfish motives successfully and
delay short-term gratification, s/he would be able to benefit from
parental investment for a longer period of time (Nesse, 1990).
This perspective is compatible with purely biological motivations
observed in resembling animal hordes as previously mentioned
above (e.g., elephant seals). In fact, there is data to support that
in humans, likelihood of parents getting murdered by their off-
spring increase as they age (Daly and Wilson, 1988) suggesting
that parents are being devalued exponentially as they lack their
resource provider roles, but the contribution of intra-family sex-
ual motivations to such homicides would be highly debatable in
themodern society. Both the psychoanalytical theory and the evo-
lutionary biology conceptualize child’s role in the family triad
similarly; stating that the child is motivated to separate the par-
ents. However, evolutionary biology posits that the motivation is
not of sexual nature as put forward by the psychoanalytical the-
ory, but it is about maximizing parental investment by deferring
mother’s labor as much as possible. In this respect, evolutionary
biology provides a viewpoint which is applicable to all species of
mammals that mostly produce heterozygotic cubs which rely on
their mother’s investment mostly until they reach sexual maturity
and be able to survive on their own.
The next subsection explores the significance of fire in human
natural history and discusses whether the acquisition of fire could
be a form of sublimation driven by frustration of sexual impulses.
Secondly, the conditional role of this sublimation in explaining
how a transition from purely biological mechanisms to psycho-
logical mechanisms could become possible in the primitive man
will be discussed. Taking this perspective, I aim to provide one
possible reconstruction of the primal horde which allows gradual
formation of the superego.
FIRE AND ITS MEANING IN PSYCHOANALYTICAL
LITERATURE
The acquisition of fire is probably one of the most significant
achievements in human evolution (Burton, 2011). Therefore,
prior to discussion of its psychoanalytical meaning it is important
to provide a brief overview of anthropological and archaeological
evidence regarding domestication of fire, suitable for the pur-
pose of this manuscript. Studies conducted on fossilized charcoal
samples suggest that wildfires started to occur as early as 420
million years ago (Ma) after terrestrial plants appeared in the
Silurian period (Scott and Glasspool, 2006). The spread of highly
flammable savannas changed the flora in Africa and this may have
contributed to hominids’ acquisition of fire (Ségalen et al., 2007).
In the Mediterranean region, lightning has been suggested as the
major cause of natural wildfires (Whelan, 1995). It has been sug-
gested that initially such naturally occurring processes were used
opportunistically to obtain fire for heating purposes and as an
orientation point while travelling inland (Bellomo, 1994). Fossil
studies claim that the evidence of cookingmay date back to 1.9Ma
(Wrangham et al., 1999). However, reliable evidence of control
over fire in the African hominids dates back to the Pleistocene
period (Bellomo, 1994), although it has been suggested that early
domestication of fire was restricted for use as a means of pro-
tection against predators and for lighting and heating (Bellomo,
1994). A more recent study claims that hominid evidence of con-
trol over fire for domestic purposes has been found in Gesher
Benot Ya’aqov, Israel, dating back to 790,000 years ago (Goren-
Inbar et al., 2004). In the light of these archeological findings, it
may be proposed that the primal horde could date back to the
early to middle Pleistocene period.
FIRE IN PSYCHOANALYTICAL LITERATURE
Psychoanalytical interpretation of the significance of fire, could be
discussed in three important domains: inhibition of an instinc-
tual urge to extinguish fire when it is encountered, lighting fire by
using stone objects which could produce spark and control of fire
in a particular place and size. Psychological meaning of fire was
first considered by Freud (1930a,b) in a footnote to Civilization
and Its Discontents. Subsequently, Freud (1932) elaborated on
his initial assumptions regarding the acquisition and control of
fire:
“in order to gain control over fire, men had to renounce the
homosexually tingled desire to put it out with a stream of urine.”
(p. 187)
Freud’s arguments were based on material derived from the myth
of Prometheus who has stolen the fire protected by Gods and
carried in a hollow stick. Erlenmeyer (1932) supported Freud’s
view by citing Genghis Khan’s ruthless death penalties subjected
to those who failed to renounce the instinctual passion for extin-
guishing fire. Regardless of the unconscious motive behind it,
these authors who provided the first psychoanalytical discussions
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related to fire, agree that there is an instinctual involvement in
extinguishing fire.
It is possible that there may be differences for what it is meant
to be understood by “instinct” between Freud and contemporary
psychoanalytical authors, particularly for discussions related to
meaning of peripheral symbols, such as in this case; fire, which
are not central to understanding fundamentals of the psycho-
analytical theory. Freud in his seminal work, Instincts and their
Vicissitudes (1915), made a distinction between Instinkt and Trieb,
and used Instinkt predominantly, but not mutually exclusively,
to define motivational aspects of animal behavior, whereas pre-
ferring Trieb mainly for driving forces of human actions. How
well these differences in original German language is translated
to the English audience remains a matter of debate, and there
have been suggestions that the original work should have been
translated as “Drives and Their Fate” (Mills, 2004), capturing the
temporal dynamics of drives: initiating from the unconscious,
guiding/motivating the behavioral toward an aim and extinguish-
ing once the driving need is fulfilled as Freud intended to frame.
Although, differences between translations are important to men-
tion as a part of the present discussion, their terminal differentia-
tion is not fundamental to understanding its core message. It may
be useful to point out that Freud did not use Instinkt or Trieb
in the Civilization and its Discontents footnote, but instead he
initially preferred Lust when defining man’s inner urge to extin-
guish fire in the German original (p. 47), which is translated as
“desire” in the Standard Edition. On the other hand, in subse-
quent sentences he used Trieb in the same context for man, but
preferred Lust again when defining how anatomical differences
contribute to behavioral expression of such motivations differ-
ently in women (also see below). The slight variations within the
same footnote suggest that concepts related to drives, motiva-
tions and instincts are not well differentiated, and are used almost
interchangeably within the discussion related to psychological
meaning of fire.
It is important to point out that some of the difficulties in
translation of “Trieb” to English-language as “instinct” might
have originated from Lamarckian influence on Freud’s early
manuscripts and Freud’s well-known dedication to found psycho-
analytical theory in human biological psychology which might
have biased early translators of his work (who were also trainees
of psychoanalysis themselves), to overemphasize the link to bio-
logical sciences. Lamarckian understanding of instinctual animal
behavior involves stereotyped, species typical fixed action pat-
terns which may be transmitted from one generation to another
through inheritance of acquired characteristics, such that an
offspring is biologically hardwired to act in a certain way, for
example in order to get ration from the environment, even if
it does not have any opportunity to learn such behavior from
its mother. Due to the complexity of human behavior, even in
instinctual domains such as sexuality; Freud did not use instinct
(i.e., instinkt) to define human motivated behavior, but instead
preferred Trieb. This distinction implicitly suggests that Freud
conceptualized humanmotivated behavior not as stereotyped and
hardwired in many aspects as may be in other species. I think the
ongoing debate in the psychoanalytical field partially arise from
initial shortsighted translations of Freud’s work; presumably the
early translators did not foresee that subtle nuances lost or gained
in translation would remain to be a matter of debate 100 years
later. Considering that Trieb in Freud’s conceptualization con-
tains unconscious somatic driving forces for motivated behavior
(not necessarily restricted to instinctual domains such as sexual-
ity and aggression), presence of which could only be traced back
to its source by psychoanalysis of observable behavior in a sys-
tematic manner (1915), it is possible that English translations
considered “instinct” to be the most accurate word to highlight
somatic/biological component captured by the word Trieb.
Freud and Erlenmeyer’s seminal assumptions cannot be vali-
dated within the evolutionary biological theory as fire stands as
a common danger for all the members of the animal kingdom.
Therefore, their proposed instinctual behavior cannot have hard-
wired biological foundations. In the same footnote to Civilization
and Its Discontents, Freud also had differentiated sexes in relation
to the yield of this instinct. It was suggested that males have to
renounce the instinct to extinguish fire in order to tame it, where
as females due to their anatomy were appointed as the guardians
of fire. From a biological perspective the instincts are innate and
indiscriminate for both sexes. In this respect it might be argued
that females were excluded from acquiring such an instinct like
the rest of the animal kingdom. From male’s perspective, Freud’s
account implicitly suggests an ambivalent attitude toward fire:
an urge to extinguish it in the presence of an opposing urge to
keep it alive by appointing women as guardians. Therefore, the
most plausible explanation/interpretation which provides theo-
retical consistency is that man’s relationship with fire may be an
object relationship in which fire symbolizes an external object,
which is dominated by component instincts of sexual instinct in
reference to an erotogenic zone. On this issue Freud (1932) says;
“The primitive man was bound to regard fire as something analo-
gous to the passion of love.” (p. 190)
The instinctual associations of fire have been discussed further
in psychoanalytical literature, but there is paucity of discussion
in the field particularly about how the psychological meaning of
fire may have changed over the course of human evolution. Stone
(1979) suggests that oral aggressive impulses, such as the ones
expressed by Freud in the resolution of the primal horde scenario,
may be symbolically expressed by fire. There is some evidence to
support pregenital involvement in male’s relationship with fire in
the psychoanalytical literature. For example, besides highlighting
its oral significance, Grinstein (1952) presents fire as both a direct
expression of aggressive and hostile impulses as well as libidinal
ones, and conceptualizes the control over fire by retaining it in a
particular place and time, as a symbol of the anal pleasure domi-
nant in the second part of the anal stage. Therefore, there seems to
be an agreement in the psychoanalytical literature about primacy
for symbolic value associated with fire.
Some of the psychoanalytical authors went to extremes
by claiming that fire could explain anything [symbolically]
(Bachelard, 1964,p. 7). Such a global and overgeneral approach
which is detected in one of the earliest accounts of “psychoanalyti-
cal” investigation of [themeaning of] fire, might have contributed
negatively to general scientific credibility of the psychoanalytical
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theory (which in itself is so rich to formulate testable hypotheses),
historically in an era where behavioral sciences were flour-
ishing, due to lack of scientific rigor in handling the subject
matter.
In order for an object to acquire a symbolic/psychological
meaning, it has to be readily available in the environment. The
object must be encountered either frequently or scarcely in a
traumatic manner in order to produce long-lasting mental repre-
sentations. Best to my knowledge, there is no anthropological or
archaeological evidence to account for how frequently Prehistoric
man encountered fire caused by natural events. Therefore, it is
not possible to handle the contribution of repetition effects in a
scientific manner any further than highlighting these principles.
Acquisition of fire could be possible either in the stage of control-
ling dying wildfires in a particular place and size or lighting fire
by using tools such as stones which could produce spark. Both of
these stages require inhibition of an urge to put out fire, particu-
larly in critical stages before skills to domesticate fire has not been
acquired successfully. Otherwise, in order to gain experience with
fire, Prehistoric man may have to wait until the next occasion in
which a wildfire occurs within travelling distance, considering the
evidence which suggests that experimentation with wildfires pre-
ceded tool based production of fire in the Stone Age, as reviewed
in the beginning of this section. I think those authors who for-
mulated that a symbolic value for fire may exist in the Prehistoric
man are mostly anachronistic, such that it is not possible for fire
to retain a symbolic value in humans without repeated safe, infre-
quent traumatic or repeated traumatic encounters with it (if it
had continuously been extinguished instinctually) and it is not
possible to formulate the urge to extinguish fire as a biological
drive which exists mutually exclusively in human males.
On the other hand, it is highly likely that the primal father
had these repetition properties, and could have acquired a sym-
bolic value prior to fire. In the primal horde, the sexuality of
the sons was denied gratification by the physically fit primal
father. Therefore, repeated physical encounters must have existed
between them, enough to create aversive mental representations
in individuals who challenge the primal father physically. As
widely accepted, sexual frustration creates aggressive impulses.
Coincidentally and unintentionally one member of the primal
horde might have manifested these two forces in operation sym-
bolically and created fire:
“He, who created it, perhaps knocked two stones to manifest his
aggression toward the father who frustrated him or created it by
friction.” (Grinstein, 1952; p. 420)
This indeed symbolizes the sexual act or the primal scene (with
one stone representing the primal father). This formulation by
Grinstein is particularly interesting and pairing the acquisition of
fire with the processes in the primal horde may be important for
reconstructing one possible scenario which allows gradual forma-
tion of superego through repeated sublimations of sexual frustra-
tion. Meta-evidence suggests that using gestures in communica-
tion is mostly common across different species of higher order
primates, but tool use in the wild is more restricted (van Schaik
et al., 1999). However, if in reality the primal horde contained
intermediate species between higher order primates and Homo
sapiens, it would be highly likely that those species, although
they may be extinct today, too had behaviors in their repertoire
which contained some elements from both of these domains (i.e.,
gestures and tool use). Modern developmental psychoanalytical
practice suggests that children’s play contain variety of behaviors
and meaningful preferences for specific toys which have symbolic
value, providing material for psychoanalytical therapy (Klein,
1997). Gestures and use of mobile objects, such as the two stones
suggested by Grinstein possibly representing a male and a female
figure in the primal scene or physical challenges between the male
members of the groups, become especially important when the
subjects have limited repertoire for verbal expression. This may
be a common denominator for both children in early course of
their lives, higher order primates and the prehistoric man. Recent
neuroscientific evidence provide support for this view, showing
that people suffering from post-stroke aphasias, particularly when
stroke affects speech production regions in the brain (i.e., Broca’s
aphasia), display elevated gestures relative to a healthy subjects in
order to compensate for decreased capacity for verbal commu-
nication (Sekine and Rose, 2013). Similar tactile movements if
combined by using stone objects which could spark in commu-
nication, might have contributed to lighting fire which is likely
to be accidental in the first occasion. This constitutes the second
important step toward acquisition of fire, by which Prehistoric
man could learn to reignite fire even if it is blown out by external
forces.
The final step in the sequence of events which lead to acqui-
sition of fire is the ability of controlling fire in a particular
place and size, in order to capture its most useful properties
for everyday use. Transition from observing how fire lights up
from sparks and investment of time to understand its proper-
ties, as well as symbolic representation of sexual or aggressive
encounters in the primal horde (by knocking stones together)
could be formulated as initial forms of sublimation, as the indi-
vidual who accomplished this, must have diverted his attention
away from immediate instinctual frustrations. This is how Freud
(1915a,b), and Nietzsche (1878) earlier, conceptualized sublima-
tion: as “engagement in activities which divert frustrated sexual
energy into creative ends” (Gemes, 2009). Grinstein’s reconstruc-
tion of the primal scene (see above) is a vivid example of how
transition from frustrated sexual impulses could be invested in
to understanding the nature of aversive elements, such as in this
case fire. However, there are other psychoanalytical authors who
suggested sublimation particularly concerns instinctual frustra-
tions in the pregenital stages as genital sexuality is either repressed
or satisfied due to the dominance of pleasure principle in this
stage (Deri, 1939). Therefore, conceptually, it must be excluded
from the scope of sublimation. As stated previously, Grinstein
(1952) formulated that there may be pregenital involvement in
the final stage of taming fire, particularly about attention dedi-
cated to maintaining fire burning and keeping it at a safe size.
This raises the question whether regression to earlier psychosex-
ual development stages may lead to expression of sublimation in
different ways, producing behaviors related to conservation, such
as in the case with fire (or for example conservation of historical
items/arts in the modern world).
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Evaluating acquisition of fire as a form of sublimation with
high evolutionary significance is compatible with both psychoan-
alytical theory and evolutionary biology. Once any given member
of the primal horde acquired skills to produce fire repeatedly by
using sparking stones and to control it safely in a particular size,
it is plausible that it might have contributed to his survival fitness
in physical confrontations with the primal father. If there is an
imbalance in the level of skills related to the use of fire, such that
the primal father lacked this knowledge in a physical challenge, it
is likely that he would submit to the new authority or flee from
the horde.
Application of behavioral economics is common to both evo-
lutionary biology and psychoanalysis (particularly important in
understanding secondary gains from neuroses observed in some
patients; see Freud, 1923, p. 50). The acquisition of fire equipped
prehistoric man against environmental dangers such as predators,
night and cold weather:
“The acquisition of fire produced subsequent secondary grat-
ifications of a kind which aided the development of further
sublimations, and were utilized to advantage in the progress of
civilization.” (Grinstein, 1952; p. 334)
Similarly, Dawkins (1982) emphasizes the evolutionary con-
straints on perfection of the organisms in terms of economical
use of bodily resources:
“For a bird, resources spent on making breast muscles for power-
ing wings are resources that could have been spent onmaking eggs.
An enlarged brain would permit a finer tuning of behavior to envi-
ronmental details, past and present, but at a cost of an enlarged
head, whichmeans extra weight at the front end of the body, which
in turn necessitates a larger tail for aerodynamic stability, which in
turn. . .” (p. 47)
The acquisition of fire enabled prehistoric man to maximize
what can be achieved by limited bodily/evolutionary resources.
Therefore, the excessive evolutionary yield was made available,
to be invested in the evolution of the rest of the body and the
brain. Clark and Harris (1985) suggest that in early hominid life
fire was particularly used as a lighting source and as a means of
protection from dangerous animals, providing support for these
evolutionary processes. Evolutionary expenditures such as achiev-
ing muscular fitness to confront predators or growing thick fur to
stay warm would have gradually lost their priority. Exponentially,
fire would have significantly improved the nutritional properties
of both plant and animal foods (Stahl et al., 1984), increasing
the overall energy efficiency of the hominid as a complete bio-
logical entity. The long term impacts of the smallest advantages
created by acquiring an advantageous behavioral strategy have
been suggested by Slavin and Kriegman (1992). These authors
showed that a behavioral strategy which creates 1/10,000 advan-
tage in reproductive fitness would lead to 692,981 more offspring
in just 99 generations (p. 288). In a similar fashion, the evolution-
ary resource savings achieved by the acquisition of fire were then
invested in to the evolution of a more complex cerebral cortex.
This diverted the course of evolution, separating Homo sapiens
from other animals in terms of complexity of psychological
processes which emerged.
Sublimation provides two-fold reinforcements for human evo-
lution. The detrimental effects of close interbreeding were prob-
ably resolved. Sublimation created opportunities to maximize
individual gains while at the same time equipping prehistoricman
against surrounding dangers. Sublimation as a deviant strategy
(novel strategies which improve cost-efficiency of tool use even
further) increased the likelihood of sexual reproduction for the
members within a social horde other than the alpha male, by
introducing an alternative to avoidance strategies which guide
male members into competition to reach to an optimum size
and fitness. Individuals using any deviant strategy (any behav-
ioral modification that leads to higher cost efficiency relative to
what has been achieved by the rest of the population) maxi-
mized their gains and these strategies which would have higher
reproduction fitness would spread out in the population until
they reach to an equilibrium point, becoming an ESS. From this
time point, every little invention created evolutionary resourceful
savings that are indirectly invested in the evolution of the cor-
tex. The inventors maximized individual gains through savings of
evolutionary resources. Each individual became a deviant micro-
strategy spreading their skills until a new equilibrium point was
established across the population, exponentially contributing to
the advancement of civilization.
LIMITATIONS
The current discussion inevitably suffers from the very same lim-
itation Freud faced nearly 100 years ago. What one may call the
“socio-moral anthropology” cannot dissociate itself from the gen-
eration of hypotheses which cannot be empirically tested due
to a lack of written evidence dating back to the Pleistocene or
any other Prehistoric period. Therefore, this account may be
perceived as speculative by the readers. Even though it is pos-
sible to foresee that another 100 years may not be enough to
increase the accuracy of reconstructions such as the one proposed
here, advances in related fields such as evolutionary biology, evo-
lutionary economics, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, and
primate research may help proposing more up-to-date models. It
is highly likely that the new findings emerging in these fields will
shed light to our origins as a moral agent.
CONCLUSION
It is commonly acknowledged that Freud wanted to ground psy-
choanalytical theory within the earth sciences. However, this
article suggests that theoretical discussions can be advanced by
considering contributions from the life sciences. Freud’s views
on the primal horde are taken into consideration in the light
of modern evolutionary biology and the acquisition of fire in
the Prehistoric times. The latter is regarded as the most signifi-
cant achievement which might have led to critical evolutionary
resourceful savings. The possible role of sublimation in the acqui-
sition of fire has been explored and a link between sublimation
and the ultimate evolution of cerebral cortex is proposed. The
possible role of this process in explaining the gradual formation of
the superego has been discussed. The present approach somewhat
contradicts Freud’s hypothesis about the origins of conscience
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and superego in the primal horde which is presented as if these
have emerged instantly. The discussion presented here implicitly
suggests that Freud’s primal horde was already far ahead of sim-
ilar animal hordes on the evolutionary timeline. The presence of
self-conscious moral emotions (Tangney et al., 2007) such as guilt
suggests that the members of the primal horde achieved a tran-
sition from purely biological mechanisms to other psychological
mechanisms/motivators. The author proposes that further theo-
retical discussions could accredit psychoanalytical theory within
both life and earth sciences and contribute to the production of
testable empirical hypotheses in the future.
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